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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
ADVERS& PossESSION-LIFE TENANT UND&R .Yom. Dtvisi; HOLDING AGAINST"
Iti:YAINDERHAN.-Testratrix was seised in fee of certaia tenements, Yt'hich by
a void will she devised to her husband for life with remainder over. The
husband entered claiming under the will and held for the statutory period.
Upon his death the remainderman claimed possession under the will on the
ground that as the husband also claimed under the will he was estopped from
setting up its invalidity. Held, title in fee accrued to the husband and his
heirs by adverse possession ; for the wi11 being void the husband was not
estopped from denying the title of the remainderman. In re Coale, [1920)
2 Ch. 536.
The English cases have-definitely established that a life tenant under a
void will, who claims under the will for the statutory period gets title by
adverse possession; and is not stopped from denying the title of the remainderman. Paine v. Jones, (1874), L. R., 18 Eq. 320 ;. In re Coale, supra.
On the other hand where the testator's title is defective, but whatever interest he does have is conveyed by a valid instrument and thereafter the possession of the life tenant perfects the devisor's title, the benefit of that possession will enure to those claiming in remainder, for the life tenant is estopped
from denying the title of the deviser. Bo_ard v. Board, (1873), L. R. 9 Q.
B., 48; In re Anderson, [I9<>5] 2 Ch. 70. The distinction is that in the latter
case the life tenant acquire·s possession by force of the devise; an4 having
accepted a benefit thereunder will not be allowed to say that the common
testator did not have the title, which in fact was outstanding in another. See
28 YALE LAW JOURNAL 219. Th.ere are some American courts which do not
follow this distinction. In Hanson v. Johnson, (1884), 62 Md. 25, the court
held that a tenant for life claiming under a void will was estopped from
denying the title of the remainderman. This however was unnecessary "to
the decision of the case. To the same effect is Anderson v. Rhodus, (I86o, .S. C.), 12 Rich. Eq. 104, where the court says that the possession of the life
tenant was not hostile to the remainderman; but was in assertion and support
of their common title. The trouble with this is that there is no common title
when the devise is invalid. "Neither the life tenant nor the remainderman
receive any title under the will. Whatever title the life tenant gets he acquires by his own w.rongful act. His possession is analogous to that of a
donee under a void gift who can, by holding for the statutory period, acquire"
a title good against the donor and all others claiming through him. Why
therefore should the life tenant be estopped from denying the title of one
who is not in privity with the life tenant's source of title. If however the
will is valid then there is a common source of title. The life tenant does
not then hold adversely to the devisor; and if his possession perfects the
defective title of the testator the benefit should enure to those in remainder.
It is submitted that the American decisions are not sound in principle and
that the better doctrine is that applied by the English courts.
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AuTOHOBILES-STATUTE GIVING VEHICLE APPROACHING FROM: THS RlGH'l'
THS RIGHT OF WAY-VIO~ATION OF STATUTE AS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENC2
Pe& Si::.-A Minnesota statute provides that the driver of any vehicle approaching an intersection shall give the right of way to any other vehicle
approaching from his right. In an action to recover for damage to his car
resulting from a -collision with the defendant'~ car at an intersection, the
plaintiff's own "testimony demonstrated that the defendant's car was approaching from the plaintiff's right. Held; that the plaintiff's proceeding in violation
.of the· statute was contributory negligence as a matter of law. Lindahl v.
Morse, (Minn., 192I), 181 N. W. 323.
The decision merely follows the general rul!! that violation of a statute
is negligence per se. -Travers v. Hartma1i, 28 Pel. 302, (riding a bicycle down
the left side of the street); Donova1~ v. Lambert, 139 Ill. App. 532, (driving
a buggy down the wrong side of the street). However, the violation of the
statute must be the proximate cause of. the injury. Coffin v. Laskaw, 8g
Conn. 325; Reynolds v. Pacific Car Company, 75 Wash. I. A distinction is
sometimes drawn between violations of statutes and viol~tions of city ordinances, the latter violations being merely prima facie evidence of negligence.
Scott v. Dow, I62 Mich. 636.
BoUNTIES-,DRAFTED MAN INDUCTED INTO MILITARY SERVICE BUT ReJECT£J>
AT CANTONMENT NoT ENTITLED TO BoNus.-The Public Laws of Rhode Island,
Chapter I832, Sectio.n 2, provided that a bonus be granted "To· each * * *
eniisted man * * * who was mustered into the federal service and reported
for active duty on or after April 6, I917, and prior to November II, 1918."
Plaintiff ·was inducted into service during this period but was promptly rejected upon reaching camp because of bad teeth. Upon petition for a writ of
certiorari praying that the record of the decision of the Sold,iers' Bonus Board
disallowing the plaintiff's application for a bonus be quashed, it was held, that
plaintiff was never mustered into the service within the meaning of the
statute and: therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to a bonus. BaKKister v.
Soldiers' Bonus Board, (R. I., 1921), II2 Atl. 422.
As pointed out in Tyler v. Pomero)', go Mass. 48<>, "as late as -the reign of
Charles H, the greatest lawyers in England overlooked the distinction between martial and military Iaw,-between the military rule, not limited to
the army, which prevails in time of war, when the civil laws have lost their
fotce, and the military discipline, necessary to the government of an army
at all times." It is true, as plaintiff contended, that if he had refused to obey
the order to report at camp after he .had been inducted into service by the
local draft board he would have been liable to punishment as a deserter:--not
because he had been "mustered into service," howeve11. but because he was
subject to military law and regulations as provided in Section 2 of the
Selective Service law. The fact that plaintiff had .received a $6o bonus under
the National Soldiers' Bonus Act is not controlling, for the provisions of that
act are different from the provisions of the statute construed in the instant
case. The federal bonus' act contains no provision that the applicant must
have been "mustered into the federal service." The interpretatioi:i put upon
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the word "muster" by the court in the instant case, which no doubt seems at
first blush to be extremely technical, is nevertheless sustained by a great
number of adjudged cases· both in this country and in England. Methuen v.
Martin., Sayer, I07; Grant v. Gould, 2 H. Bl. I03i Wolton v. Gavin, I6 Q. B.
-48; Bamfield v. Abbot, 9 Law Rep. SIOj Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. (U. S.)
20. Certainly such an interpretation carries out the probable intent of the
legislature in passing the Act. Moreover, it scarcely can be contended that
the result reached by the court was not an equitable one.
CARRn:RS-CoNTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PASSENGt:R IN FAILING TO WilN
TAXI DRIV<:R OF IMPENDING DANG<:R.-While the plaintiff was riding in one
of the defendants cabs the driver negligently came into collision with another
car. .According to the testimony of the plaintiff she saw the other car approaching on an intersecting street when both cars were one hundred feet
from the intersection but failed to warn the driver of the taxicab. The trial
court refused to give a charge on contributory negligence. Held, that there
was no evidence sufficient to support a charge of contributory negligence. A
taxicab company is a common carrier of passengers, and "a..passenger has the
right to rely upon the presumption that the carrier is familiar with the dangers
to be apprehended and will use all necessary skill and vigilance to avoid
them." McKeller v. Yellow Cab Co., Inc., (Minn., I92I), 18I N. W. 341!.
A taxicab company is generally held to be a common carrier, the reason
being that it holds itself out to serve all who apply for transportation at a
fixed charge. Carlton v. Boudar, u8 Va. 52I; Van Hoefjen v. Columbia
Taxicab Co., 179 Mo. App. 59I. Hence, they are bound. to do all that human
care and foresight can reasonably do, consistent wit)l the character and mode
of conveyance adopted, to prevent accidents and injuries to passengers _carried
by them. Boland v. Gay, 201 Ill. App. 35I. Even though a negligent act on
the part of the passenger which proximately contributes to the inh1ry may
preclude his recovery from the carrier, it is generally held that mere failure
to act even in the face of imminent danger will not. Grand Rapids & Indiana R. Co. v. Ellison, II7 Ind. 234. Thus, where a passenger on a railrciad
saw a tx:ain approaching on an intersecting road, his failure to warn the engineer by pulling the bell cord was held not to preclude his recovery: Grand
Rapids & Indiana R. Co. v. Ellison, supra. And a passenger on a bus is
not guilty of contributory negligence in failing to warn the driver of
excessive speed. Harmon v. Barber, 247 Feq. I. And a passenger on a train·.
is not bound to notify the conductor of the presence of an iron frame which
is likely to fall and injure him. Difje11derfer v. Penn. R. Co., 67.Penn. Super.
Ct. Rep. 187. The law correctly draws a distinction between the duty of the
passenger in a taxicab and the duty of a guest in an automobile to warn the
driver of impending perils. As to the duty of the guest, see Howe \'. Core:y,
{~is., 1920), I79 N. W. 791. I9 M1cu. L. RE\'. 433.
0

CARRIERS-DEGREE oF CARE Nr,cr:ssARY IN KF.EPiNG A1s~t:s FRtt.-Plaintiff
had been a passen.ger in a Pullman chair car and sued for an injury received
from stumbling over footstool in th~ ,aisle. He was no~ .allow.ed to recover

a
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since it was held, that a railroad company is only liable for the failure to
exetcise ordinary ·care in -seeing that the movable hassocks provided in a chair
car do not project into the aisle. Bassell v. Hines, (C. C. A., 6th Circuit,
'December, 1920), 269 Fed. 231.
In general the common carrier of passengers is liable for the failure to
exercise the highest degree of care and prudence consistent with the exercise
of its business. Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Bobo, 232 Fed. 7o8-; Meyer v. St.
Louis Co., 54 Fed. u6. The basis of this seems -to be that when the passenger delivers himself-into the custody of the carrier, he submits himself
to his care and relies upon the carrier's protection from all the hazards of the
journey. bidianapolis Co. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291, _23 Ii. Ed. 898. ·since the
basis of this rule is protection of the passeng(!r from the dangers peculiarly
incident to the instrumentality of transportation, the reason for the rule ceases
when questions arise as to liability for the trifling dangers that are found
upon the railroad car in the same way that they might be p·resent in the w11lks
of every-day life. Stumbling over a hassock which is under the control of
the passenger takes away the responsibility that is present in the case of those
clements of travel that are within the sole control and management of the
carrier. Hence the general weight of authority supports the principal case in
liolding that only ordinary care need be exercised by the carrier in the cases
of obstructions placed in the aisle and within the control of passengers.
Thus, baggage left in the aisle and causing injury places no liability on the
carrier unles-s there has been actual notice to the carrier's si:rvants of its
presence there, or it has been there such a time as to imply constructive notice.
Burns v. Penn. R. Co., 233 Pa. 304; Palmer
Penn. Co., III N. Y. 488, 18
N. E. 859; Atkinson v. IJ.ean, 198 Ala. 262, 73 So. 479. On the other hand; if
it appears that the carrie~ has had time to notice the presence of the baggage,
as in Chicago and A. R. Ry. Co. v. Buckmaster, 74 .Ill. App. 57S, where a bag
was left in the aisle two hours, or where the porter of the car has had actual
notice of the presence of the bag in the aisle, the carrier has been held liable
for the injuries resuJting therefrom. Levien v. Webb, 61 N. Y. Supp. 1u3.
In only a· few cases are there any intimations of a different rule from that in
the principal.case. In Heineke v. Chi. Ry. ·co., 279 Ill. 210, u6 N. E. 761, a
higher degree of care seems necessarily implied from the statement of the
court to the effect that if the carrier might have. known of the presence of
the baggage, it would be liable. And in Pitcher v. Old Colony Co., 196 Mass.
69, St N. E. 876, the statement of the trial court that the carrier must exercise
"the highest degree of care consistent with the practical carrying on of its
business" was not criticised. For a collection ot cases of this type, see 13
L. R. A. (N. S.), 482, and 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1050.

v.

CARRIERS-RATS Rr:GuLATION: FIXING RATtS oN SINGLE CLAss oF Co1111on1Tms-Suit to restrain the railroad from receiving any other compensation
for carrying certain classc;s of property than that specified in the order of the
·state Railroad Commission. The railroad claims that the order did not allow
sufficient revenue to reimburse it on such commodities, and yield a fair return. Plaintiff claims that revenue fropi whole intrastate business of de-
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Cendant may be taken into account, in determining remuneration. Held, state
may not select certain goods, and compel railroad to carry without remuneration, even though revenue from intrastate business as a whole gives a profit.
Vandalia Railroad Co. v. Sc/mull, (Feb., I92I), U. S. Supreme Court.
This decision clinches the doctrine laid down in N. Pac. Ry. Co. Y. North
Dakota, 236 U. S. 585, I3 MICH. LAW Ri::v. 676•. The basis of that decision
was that the State may not segregate one class of goods, and compel a railroad to carry it without substantial compensation, for this might compel
carrying some other class of goods at a double profit. A railroad may be
compelled to operate a branch passenger line at an actual loss, if its whole
state passenger service gives remuneration; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ka'Mas, 2I6
U. ·S. 262. But it is now settled that in deciding whether passenger rates are
confiscatory, the passenger service must be considered· by itself, and not in
connection with freight; N~rfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Conley, 236 U.S. 005; Pa.
Rd. Co. v. Philadelphia County, 220 Pa. St. Ioo; see Groesbeck Y. Duluth, S.
S. & A. Ry. Co., 250 U. S. 6o7. In regard to freight, it is not essential that
the railroad earn the same percentage of profit on all classes of sen·ice. See
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, supra. The Supreme Court seems to have
been feeling its way· to the position taken in the North Dakota case, and the
principal case. In Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Minn., I86 U. S. 257,
it was suggested that each case must be determined on its own merits, although the contention of the railroad, that if the rate on the particular
commodity were to be applied to all other classes of commodities, the road
could not pay operating expenses, was answered by saying that the Commission need not reduce all rates; but may reduce one, if considered too high.
The difficulty of determining the cost of transporting a given commodity was
brought out in N. Pa.c. R. Co. v. Not'th Dakotc, 2I6 U. S. 579, and it was
held that where there ~re too many elements of uncertainty in determining
it, the constitutional question is not presented. See Atl. Coast Line Rd. Co.
v. Florida, 203 U. S. 256. If the determination of the cost of carrying a single
class of commodities were· clearcut and exact, there could be no quarrel with
the principal case, as that would be a business-like method. But it may well
be that temporarily,· the public interest is pest served by permitting certain
commodities to be carried at a large profit, while compelling others to be
carried without remuneration. Differences in rates and percentage of profit
are undoubtedly unavoidable; they should not be disproportionate. Hence,
it seems difficult to fix a rate without relation to other rates, and to the whole
schedule of rates. Southern Ry: Co. v. Atlanta Works, 128 Ga. at>]. But with
improvement in accounting, the principal case would be correct. Perhaps it
is in advance of the time. Cf. Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Rd. Commissio,., 251
U.S. 2¢. And it would seem that it is not"the railrqad, which makes a profit
from its intrastate business as a whole, but rather the shipper of other commodities, on which the rate must be disproportionately high; who has the
right to complain.
·
,
CHAMP:ERTY AND MAINTENANc&-CONTRACT PROHIBITING DISMISSAL OJc!.·
ACTION W1THouT ATTORN:EY's CoNSENT.-Ati attorney made a contract with
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his client providing that the. case should not be settled or compromised· without his consent, and that if the settlement should be made contrary to this
agreement, he should be entitled to damages of $r,ooo. rhe client settled and
dismissed for nothing. In a suit for the $:{,(XlO dam"ages, held, that the" contr<!Ct was void and unenforceable. Hall v. Orloff, (Cal. App., r920), 194
Pac.29(5.
.
Such a clause in contracts between attorney and client for a contingent
fee has frequentiy been held void: North. Chicago Ry. C(), v. Ackley, (18g8),
171 Ill. ioo. Re Snyder, (1907), 190 N. Y. 66. Other cases may be found·in
14 L. R. A. (.N. S.) nor. However other· courts "have held that such a pro-_
vision "is a proper stipulation as a measure of ·protection to the attotney's interest. Re Fernbacker, (1886), 18 Abb.-N. C. I· (N. Y.). The ·rule in Lipsfomb v. Adams, (1966), 193 Mo. 530, that such a clause might 'or.might not
contravene public policy depending- upon the geOd faith of the conduct and
dealings of the parties under it, is an anomal}". In construing contracts with
provisions of this nature it is gener~lly ·held that the .provision as to settlement is an integral .part of.1in entire agreement and if i.t is void. the whole'
contract falls. Davis v. Webber, (18gg)·, 66 Ark. Igo. This is tlie view
adopted in the case in question, and is-.probabfy the better _view, as th~ attorney can s"till recover in general assumpsit for the reasonable value of his
services, as pointea' out in the principal cas.e. The decision -as a whole, is in
accordance wlth the· modem idea of enco·uraging conciliation, for such a stipulation tends to prevent this and stands in the way-qf ~micable adjustment of
controversi~s. The: distinction sought to be drawn between the principal. case
~1d the prior California case of Hoff.1na1J. v.. Vallejo, (1873), 45 Cal. 564,
do.es not seem to be wholly satisfactory, and there might be some question
whether the Appellate Court, being bound by this prior decision of "the Supreme Court, shouid not have decided t~e case the other way.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DEFINING ·OF TREASON IN Ftn!tRAI. CONSTITUTION
Doi::s NOT Lr:u:IT Pow:ER oit STATE TO DEAL WITH "CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM."-- ·
~ef'endant was convicted for violati~n of a state statute maki~g the advocacy
of crime as a means of changing the social order, or the organizing of or belonging to, an organization advocating crime for such purpose; a felony: and
appealed on the ground th.at the statute was unconstitutional ber-ause it
am6unted to an attempt to punish constructive treastm. Held, the df.aning of
treason in the Federal Constit1,1iion docs not limit the power of the state to
pass such a statute. State v. H.emiessy,_ (Wash., r921), 195 Pac. 211.
Counsel fo"r the defen"dant in the principal case would seem to have
grasped at a last straw. Their argument on the point covers a wide range,
and the clauses in the Federal. Constitution forbidding the abridgemen·t of
free s:peech, and the abridgement of privileges and immunities .of citizel}s of
.the United States are brought into it, for some reason, in addition to the
provision defining treason. Undoubtedly the state statute is l?roader than the
constitutional provision that treason against the United States shall consist
only in levying war against them or aiding their enemies, for an overt act is
required "and there is no constructive tr~ason. In re Charge to Grand fur)',
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s Blatch. 549. "J4eyying war," however, includes forcible opposition, as the
result of a combination, to the execution of any public law of the Gnited
States. U.S. v. Mitchell, 2 Dall. (U. S.) 348; U.S. v. Vigol, 2 Dall. (U. S:)
346. The opposition must include: (I) A combination or conspiracy, by
which different individuals are united for one purpose; (2) a common purpose to prevent the execution of a public law of the United Stat~s; (3) the
actual use of force to pre'vent the execution of the law. I.n re Charge to
Grand Jury, 2 Curt. 630. The last would be unnecessary under the \Vashington statutes. Clearly, however, the treason clause was not intended to ·1imit
the power of the states to protect .their institutions from dangerous and
destructive attacks of any. nature, merely because they have not ripened into
treason. Ex.parte Bal/mat~, 8 U. S. 75. It would seem to be absurd to contend for the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States to
-<>rganize for the purpose of ·advocating crime and violence as a means of
effecting or resisting political ·change. The only possible constitutional objection is that freedom of speech is abridged by the statute. The "'ashington
Consti~tion protects freedom of speech but excepts the abuse of the right.
Violations of similar statutes have been held to be such abuses as to be without the constitutional protection. State v. Fox, 71 Wash. 185, affirmed 236
U. S. 273; State v. M oilen, 140 Minn. 112. Certainly the federal guaranty does
not extend to incitement to crime and violence. 19 MxcH. L. R£v. 48i;
FIUlUND, POLICE Powtt, p. 510. It is absurd t'o suppose that any sovereignty
will allow its safety and welfare to be undermined by literal interpretations of
constitutional ~aranties.
CoNSTI'l'UTIONAL LAW-STAT£ CEMENT PLANT.-The Governor of South
Dakota addressed an inquiry to the judges of the Supreme Court as to the
validity of an issue of bonds -under an act of the legislature providing for the
establishment of a state cement plant. The constitution of the state declares
that the manufacture, distribution and sale of cement are works of public
jlecessity ana importance, in which the state may engage. H cld, that taxation for such purpose is ·constitutional. In re Opinion of the J11dges, (So. D .•
1920), I8o N. W. 957.
'rhat a tax should be in aid of a public purpose is inherent in the power
of taxation, and the co.urts can declare a tax invalid, if it is· not for a public
purpose, without tlie aid of a constitutional provision. GR.w, TAXATio:.r, 123- ·
129; It is common, however, for .state constitutions to include a prohibition
against taxing for other than a public purpose. The United States Supreme
Court is not justified in·holding an act in violation of the state constitution
in the face of clear decisions of the state supreme court to the contrary; sec
Fallbro,ok lrrigatio.11 Distri<t v. Bradley, 164 U. S. u2, 155. "The due process
of law clause contains no specific limitations upon the right of taxation in
the states, but it has come to be settled that the al)thority of the states to tax
does not_; include th.e right to impose taxes for merely private purpose~."
Green v. fra::icr; 253 U.S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. 499, 501. See Jt:osox- o"-s TAX,\Tiox,
§ § 340, 343. On the authority of Gr.ec11 v. Pra::icr, the judges in the principal
case were of the opinion that the Supreme Court would consider this valid
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under the Fourteenth Amendment, if the case were before them. In Grec11
v. Fra:;ier, a statute creating a state bank, mill and elevator association, and a
home building association, under the authority of the constitution of the
state, was held valid, considering the peculiar condition of the state. The
court says, "With this united action of people, legislature and constitution,
we are not at liberty to interfere unless it is clear beyond reasonable controversy that rights secured by the Federal Constitution have b-.
-·'-'"lted."
This would seem to be th€ rule even where there is no sanction by the state
constitution. If so, another strong case is Jones v. Portland, 245 U. S. 217,
where a municipal wood and coal yard, authorized by statute alone, fuel to
be furnished at cost to buyers, was upheld. To be sure, the court considered
it a means of furnishing heat, and sufficiently analogous to furnishing light
and water to be a public purpose. Massachusetts has held municipal fuel
yards to be not a public purpose; Opi11wn of the Justices, I55 Mass. 598,
Opiliion of the Justices, 182 Mass, 6o5. See Baker v. Grand Rapids, I42 Mich.
687. To determine whether or not a particular tax is for a public purpose,
the direct beqefit to the public should be taken into account, aiso a consideration of what is feasible for the government to do, under exis·=-..,. conditions;
i. e., whether the particular function could not be better done by private individuals, and also, whether conditions, under which it has been considered
unfeasible have changed·. See Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655,
Opinions of the Justices, supra, and in 2II Mass. 624. A county cement plant,
without a constitutional provision authorizing it, was held not to be a public
purpose in Los Angeles v. Leids, I75 Cal. 777. Allowing municipal waterwo~ks to manufacture ice was held to be public purpose in .Holtori v. Camilla,
I34 Ga. 56o. In Unio1i Ice and Coal Co. v. Ruston, I35 La. 898, a municipal
ice plant was held not a public purpose, but the court said, "no one would
contest the right * * * if the town were of proper size for such .a thing,"
under a state constitution requiring "strict" public purpose, for municipal
undertakings. North Dakota v. Nelso1i Co., I N. D. 88, under' constitutional
prohibition against taxing for aid of individuals except for necessary support
of the poor, a statute authorizing distributi~n of seed corn to needy farmers
on credit, in time of drouth, was held valid. Jones v. Portland, Green v.
Fra::ier, supra, and the· principal case seem to show a tendency towards paternalism, for these undertakings seem to be peculiarly fitted for private undertaking, although municipal fuel yards may be perfectly proper. If a state
can be permitted to operate cement plants, there seems to be little it could
not do. ·

a

CR111uN.'>L LAw-AssAt:LT WITH INTENT TO RoD-Ci..-.ru oF OWNERSHIP.-

Claiming that Green owed him $ISO, defendant demanded payment at the
point of a pistol, and upon Green's saying that he had nothing, defendant hit
him on the head with the pistol. Held, if defendant in good faith believed
that Green owed him the money, his offense was not assault with intent to
rob. Barton v. State, (Tex., 192I), 2Z}' S. W. 317.
It is well settled "that the taking, by force or putting in fear, of specific
property under bona fide claim of. right thereto, is not robbery, Glen11 v.
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State, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 349; or larceny, People v. }] oagla11d, 138 Cal. 338; State
v. Wasson, 126 Iowa 320. because of the absence of the animus furandi. The
proposition that such taking of general property to satisfy a debt is not robbery now seems to be as well established, for the instant case -overrules the
one outstanding authority _to the contrary. Fannin v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R
41. Neither is such taking to satisfy a debt larceny. Johnson v. Stat.:, 73
Ala. 523; Com. v. Stebbins, 8 Gray 492. Of course, there must be a bona fide
belief in the claim of right. Some courts hold. it robbery when the loser in
a gambling transaction forces the winner to return his money. Carrol v.
State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 30. See Grant v. State, II5 Ga. 205, contra. As far as
the law is concerned, a regime of debt collectors "with their courts in theit
right hip pockets" is discouraged only by the penalties for trespass, breach
of peace, etc. In accord with the instant case, see Reg. v. Hemming, 4 F. &
F. 50; State v. Holly.va)'. 41 Iowa 200; State v. Bro-um, 104 Mo. 365, cited
therein.
DAMAGES-CONTINUOUS TRESPASS OR REPEATED WRONG.-Defendant coal
company had worked over the boundary between its own claim and that of the
plaintiff, and removed from the plaintiff's land large quantities of coal. It
was admitted by the officers of the defendant corporation that they had
knowledge of the encroachments upon plaintiff's property as early as January,
1913, so that the original trespass must have occurred prior to that date.
Apparently, however, the defendants continued. to work across the line after
that time and to remove: coal from the plaintiff's claim. Defendants afterwards abandoned these workings and allowed the superincumbent soil to cave
in. Late in 1916, the plaintiff and his engineer recognized that these encroachments had occurred, but were de.nied admission to the defendant's mine to
ascertain the extent of the encroachments, on the plea that they could not·
get back to the division line because of the cave-in. Suit was begun March
28, 1918. The st!ltute of limitations was pleaded. It was held, that "the
statute begins to run only from the time of the actual discovery of the
trespass or from the time when discovery was reasonabfy possible," not from
the time of the trespass. Petrelli v. West Virginia .Coal Co., (W. Va., 1920),
104 s. E. 103.
Attention has before been called to the fact that neither courts nor legislatures seem to be satisfied with the conclusions reached in the English case
of Clegg v. Dearden, (1848), 12 Ad. and El. (N. S.) 575, and in the Michigan
case of The National Copper Co. v. Minnesota Mining Co., (1885), 57 Mich.
83, on the subject of so-called continuous trespass. Cf. 19 MICH. L. REV. 375
In the instant case the -court of \Vest Virginia has followed the court of
Pennsylvania in its solution of the problem, coming to a conclusion which
satisfies the sense of justice, but the legal theory of whic'h is somewhat difficult to explain .. The West Virginia court cites Lewey ·v. H. C. Fricke Coal
<;o., .(1895), 166 Pa. 536, as a precedent £-or its decision. See also Kingston
v. Lehigh Vall~y Coal Co., (1913), 241 Pa. .¢9. Although this argument gives
us a just decision, by postponing the time when the statute begins to run, it
·is a little difficult to see on principle how the dis.covery of a wrong can be
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used to date the inception of a cause of action arising from the wrong and
the consequent beginning of the period of limitation. If, however, we admit
that each day's concealment of the fraud is a new wrong, we would have a
new cause of action every day so long as the concealment continued. In the
instant case we have evidence of the concealment of th"e wrong within the
statutory period, in the refu.sal of the defendants to give to the plaintiffs
access to the defendant's mine. The Michigan court has decided, in Groendal
v. Weslrate, (1912), 171 Mich. 92, that the plaintiff's action for malpractice
of her physician was not barred by the statute, although the caus~ of action
arising from the initial negligence of the physician was barred, because within the statutory period he had "fraudulently and purp~sely concealed from
her the nature of her injury." If the "fraudulent concealment" of the statute
(Act No. 168, Pub. Acts 1905, being section 9729, 3 MICH. COMP. LAWS, as
amended), were generalized as a "repeated :wrong,''· which would give rise
to a new cause of action arising on the occurrence of such a wrong, the bar
of the statute of limitations would be removed, whether the wrong were an
injury to land, as in the instant case; an injury to the person, as in the malpractice case, Groendal v. westraie (supra.) ; or
injury to reputation, ?-S i~
the slander or libel cases, Dick \'. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., (1915), 86 Wash.
2n. Cf. 18 MicH. L. REv. 679; 19 MICH. L. Rsv. 381.

an

EVID:eNCE-CRIMINAI. LAW-PROOF OF NONCONSENT llY CIRCUMSTANTlAI.

EvIDENCE.-In a prosecution for knowingly and unlawfully taking or killing
the cattle of another, no direct evidence of the owner's nonconscnt was offered though the owner was present at the trial. The defendant moved for
a <lirected verdict on the ground of a lack of proof as to the nonconsent of
the owner to the killing. ·Held, motion denied as there were facts from which
the nonconsent could be inferred. State Y. Parry, (N. Mex., 1920), 194
Pac. 864
·
· The crime in the principal. case, like that of larceny; rests on the nonconsent of the owner to the taking or the killing, otherwise the act would
be lawful. It is the lack of consent that renders the act unlawful. This nonconsent of the own~r must be shown in order to obtain a conviction, for
otherwise no larceny would be established, Garcia v. State, 26 Tex. 209. As
to what kind of evidence is necessary to establish the nonconsent of the owner
there is some conflict. An early English case,_in a prosecution for coursing
deer without ·the consent of the ownel', held that it was necessazy on the part
of the prosecu~ion to call the owner of the deer to prove that he did not give
his consent to ~he defendant to course them. Rex v. Rogers, 2 Camp. 654.
This doctrine has been entirely repudiated and rejected by later English decisions. Rex v. Hat:y, 2 C. & P. 458; Rex v. Allen, I Moody C. C. 154. But
that case became the foundation for the doctrine that circumstantial evidence
as "to the nonconsent may· be resorted to only when direct evidence of the
owner is not ob~ainable. This doctrine is asserted in PHII.I.IPS 'ON EVIDENCE,
[4th Ed.] 635, and ·has been followed by a few states. State v. Osborne, 28
Ia. 9. At one•time Nebraska and Wisconsin also asserted this doctrine. Bub-·
ster v. State,. 33 Neb. 663; State v. Morey, 2 'Vis. 495. Bu! they have now
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abandoned it for the doctrine that nonconsent may be shown by circumstantial evidence even where the owner is present. Nixon v. State, 89 Neb.
xog; Fowle v. State, 4i \.Vis. 545. The Texas courts seem also to hold that
direct evidence where obtainable must be produced. Gomez v. State, (Tex.
Cr. App.), 2o6 S. W. 8Q. The doctrine thus asserted seems based on the so
called "best evidence" rule. But there is no general principle that the best
evidence must be produced in an cases. There are only a few definite exceptions where the best possible evidence is required. 2 W1GMORE's Evro:eNcr:,
§ 1286; Elliot v. Va1~ Buren, 33 Mich. 49- The present case is not one for
testimonial preference. That direct evidence of the nonconsent of the owner
in larceny is not required, but that, on the other hand, such nonconsent may
be established circumstantially is well recognized by the weight of authority
and reason. People v. Jacks, 76 Mich. 218; McAdams v. State, 23 Wyo. 294;
Filson v. Terr., 11 Okl. 351. There is no reason for requiring direct testimony by the owner of his nonconsent in these cases where nonconsent is an
element.of the crime. The court in the principal case rightly held that the
presumption of innocence in favor of the defendant was always sufficient
protection against an unjust conviction upon circumstantial evidence of nonconsent. The. defense in such a situation might assert the well recognized
general principle that non-production of evidence that naturally would be
produced by an honest party permits the inference that its tenor is unfavorable to that party's cause. Clifton v. U. S., 4 How. 247.. So where the owner
is not called by the prosecution to testify to his' nonconsent, an inference is
imputable that his testimony would be unfavorable to the prosecution, that if
called he would admit consent. But where the witness is equally available to
both parties, it would seem no inference cou.ld be allowed, particularly where
the witness is actually in court,-Crawford v. State, II2 Ala. 1,--or that the
inference would be available to both parties, the strength of. the inference
against either depending on circumstances. Harriman v. Railroad, 173 Mass.
28. In the principal case the inference could hardly be made use of by the
defense for the owner as a witness was equally available to both parties j-to
the defense to prove consent if such was the fact. In some cases this inference might, however, become most advantageous to the defense.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-GRANTOR'S ORAL AGREEMENT TO INCLUDt RESTRICTION CLAUSES IN DEEDS TO OTHER PeRSONS Vom.-A subdivision was platted
with the intention of making it a high-class residence section. The owner of
the tract sold lots to plaintiffs subject to building restrictions contained in the
deeds, and orally promised to place building restriction clauses in deeds to
other persons: The defendant church purchased a lot without a restrictive
clause, but with knowledge of the general plan. P now seeks to enjoin D
from erecting a church on "the lot. Held, that D, having notice of the plan
was estopped from constructing the church on the lot. Johnson v. Mt. Baker
Park Presbyterian Church, (Wash., 1920), 194 Pac. 536.
The defendant's contention was that plaintiff could not have any legal
ground for enjoining the erection of church, unless he had an interest or
easement in the lot, and that the only evidence of such i_nterest was ia the
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oral promise of the grantor to plaintiffs that it would incorporate the usual
restrictive clauses in all deeds made by it, which was void under the Statute
of Frauds. The court disposes of this claim by saying that the oral promise
would be unenforcible as an attempt to create an interest in the lands to be
conveyed, but that in this case the plaintiffs have no interest or easement in
defendant's land in the sense of the Statute of Frauds. The court gives no
e.xplanation of why the agreement is, not within the Statute of Frauds. It is
difficult to understand why the right claimed by the plaintiffs, to control and
dictate as to the use which should be made of this lot, and the manner in
which defendant should buil~ upon it, is not an interest in the land within
the Statute. In Sprague v. Kimball, 2I3 Mass. 38o, it was held that such an
agreement as is involved here created an interest in the land within the
Statute. See also, Ham v. Massoit Real Estate Co., (R. I.), 107 Atl. I205;
I9 MICH. L. REV. 2I9. However, conceding that the promise in this case is
within the statute, in some jurisdictions the decision might be- supported on
the theory of estoppel. Lennig v. Oicean City Ass'n, 4I N. ]. Eq. 6o6; Woods
v. Lawrence, (Tex.), I09 S. W. 4I8. For a general discussion of the qu~
tion see, TII'FANY, REAL PROP.ERTY, Vol. 2, [2nd Ed.] I425 et seq; 45 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 962; I6 MICH. L. R:sv. 90.
FRAuns, STATUTE oF-Pl.EADING SIGNED BY CouNSEL SuFFICttNT MQCORANDUH WITHIN 4TH SECTION OF STATUTE OF FRAuns.-A sued B for specific
performance of a contract to sell a house. Defense, signed by counsel, that
B had already contracted to sell to C, and counterclaim for rescission. A
then added C as defendant. C relied on his contract, and counterclaimed that
he was entitled to the house free from A's claim. A in answer to C relied
on the Statute of Frauds. Held, that B's defense (which contained all the
terms of C's contract) was a sufficient memorandum within the Statute, and
therefore specific performance was denied. Grindell v. Bass [Ig2(>], 2 Ch. 487·
The purpose of the Statute is not to impose a new rule of law as to what
constitutes a valid contract, but only to require a formality of proof in order
to make a contract enforceable. WILLISTON ON CoNTRACTS, SECTION 579.
Therefore, it is immaterial with what purpose the requirement of the Statute
is fulfilled. The parties do not need to intend the paper signed to be a memorandum of sale. They may have the contrary intention. For example, it is
not unusual for a party to write a letter, in which, after stating the terms of
the bargain, he repudiates it, or refuses to enter into a written contract. Yet
the courts have consistently held that such a" letter satisfies the require~ents
of the Statute. Drury v. Young, 58 Md. 546; Heideman v. Wolfstein, 12 Mo.
App. 366; Poel v. Brunswick Balke-Callender Co., II4 N. Y. S. 725; Deiuar
v. Mintoft, [I912] 2 K. B. 373. It is certainly true that the attorney in the
instant case had no authority to sign a memorandum of the sale; but, it goes
without saying, that he did have authority to sign the pleadings filed in the
former suit. The Statute requires that the memorandum be signed by the
party to be charged, or "by his agent thereunto lawfully authorized." But·
authorized to do what? Must he be authorized to sign a note or memorandum
of sale, or is it sufficient if he is authorized to sign the paper .which he did
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in fact sign? There seems to be no authority in this country on this particular point. But an English case, Cycle Corp. v. Humber, [1899] 2 Q. B.
414, held, in accordance with the conclusion in the instant case, that it was
sufficient if the agent was authorized to sign the· particular document which
he did sign. It is submitted that this is the correct view.
GA1u:-RIGuT TO SHOOT Wn.n FowL IN NAVIGABL£ WAttRs.-Defendant
trustees, acting upon the assumption that they had the exclusive right of
hunting and fishing in a certain tract, leased certain parts of a bay to a third
party "for * * * purpose * * * of the gunning privilege and the right of
shooting wild fowl." Upon the suit of a taxpayer to have the lease set aside
on the ground that the trustees possessed no right to grant such privileges,
held, that since the public had a right of passage over the bay it possessed
the right to shoot wild fowl therein, and the lease was therefore void. Smith
v. Odell, et al., (N. Y. Supreme Court, 1921), 185 N. Y. S. 647.
The decision in the instant case proceeds on the theory that the privilege
of shooting wild fowl is incidental to the right of navigation. Although some
courts have upheld this doctrine, Ainsworth v. Hunting and Fishing Club,
153 Mich. 185, u6 N. W. 992; Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal. 24, IZJ Pac. 156;
yet generally where the soil is privately owned the existence of such an incidental right has been denied. Schulte v. Warren, 218 Ill. lo8, 75 N. E. 783.
See 16 Micu. L. R1::v. 37. The court attempts to justify its stand by drawing
an analogy between the right to shoot wild fowl on navigable streams and the
right to take wild game on land upon which one enjoys an easement. The
answer is that a person who enjoys an easement on the land of another, for
example for highway purposes, has no incidental right to shoot game thereon.
He can use the land for highwa'J• purposes 011ly. Any act inconsistent with
his easement or in excess tliereof makes the person, who up to that point
was lawfully on the land, a trespasser. Queen v. Pratt, 4 El. & B. 800; Adams
v. Rivers, I I Barb. 390. The same rule should apply to the shooting of wild
game in navigable waters, in which the public enjoys only a right of passage.
INFANTS-ACTION FoR P.ReNATAL .INJURIES SusTAINABLt.-In an action
of negligence for injuries sustained while en Ventre sa mere, it was held, that
such an action could be sustained under the principles of the common law.
Drobner v. Peters (1921) 1 186 N. Y. Supp. 278.
For a good many purposes an infant en ventre sa mere has been considered in existence, but in no case so far as is known has he been allowed to
maintain a tort action for personal injuries. In general, however, the trend
of the decisions seems to be that, for all purposes beneficial to the infant, an
infant en ventre sa mere may be considered to be born. Thus such a child
has been considered to be in esse for the purpose of securing a valid limitation of estates, Long v. Blackall, 7 Durn. & East loo; Doe v. Clark, 2 H.
Black. 399; oi: he may take an· estate by bequest, Thelusson v. Woodford, 4
Ves. Jr. 22']. Or he may maintain action for the death of his father before
birth due to the wrongful or negligent acts of another, The George and
Richard, 3 L. R. Adm. 466; Herndon v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd., 37 Okl. 256,
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128 Pac. 727; Galvestoii v. Contreras, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 489, 72 S. W. 1051.
After discu,ssing Nuge11t v. Brookl)•n Heights R. Co., 154 App. Div. (lj7, .139
N. Y. Supp. 367, which the court regarded as being based up'on the fact that
no injuries to an infant en ventre sa mere due to the negligence of the carrier
were recoverable since there was no cQntract of carriage and hence no duty
on the part of the railroad to the infant, the court adopts the stand -that the
mere fact that there are no precedents for a negligence action of this character does not prevent the maintenance of one since the entire policy of the
law is to protect and give such infants every.right whii:h is for their benefit.
'!'he fact that a criminal action has long been maintainable for ·injuries causing
the death of a child while in the mother's womb seem to support an ~ction
of this sort. A strong clissent, however, presents ·a number of cases that make·
the decision of the majority. at least questionable. Nugent v. Brooklyn
Heights Rd. Co., supra, is discussed and considered as authority for the proposition that no such action may be maintained upon the basis that such an action
is one in tort rather than upon the contract, as the majority opinion states.
That such is the correct view seems to appear. from the fact that the duty
of ordinary .care arises in the case even of a gratuitous passenger, and an
infant en ventre sa mere certainly cannot pe placed in the category of a trespasser. Similar cases in which the infant was not allowed to maintain a tort
action for injuries to itself before birth are Dietrich v. Northampton, 138
Mass. 14, 75 Am. St. Rep. 176; Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56
N. E. 638; Buel v. United Rys. Co., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S. W. '/I, Got'tnan v.
Budlong, 23 R. I. 169, 91 Am. St. Rep. 629. In view of such authorities to' the
contrary and with no c:ises to support the action of such child, there seems
no basis for allowing a child to maintain a negligence action for injuries
while en ventre sa mere. See 34 HARV. L. REV. 549.
INSURANCE-ACCIDENTAL DEATH-MILITARY SERVICE.-ln an action by
the beneficiary named in an insurance policy, which provided for double indemnity "in the event of death by accidental means (murder or suicide, sane
or .insane, not included)," it was held, that the death of the insured, caused
by his being struck by a piece of shrapnel from an exploded shell while engaged in battle as a soldier, resulted through "accidental means" within the
terms of the policy. State Life Ins. Co. v. Allison, (C. C. A., Fifth Circuit,
1920), 269 Fed. 93.
An injury is not produced by accidental means, within the terms of such
a policy as _is involved in the principal case, where it is the result of an act
or acts in which the insured intentionally engages, and is caused by a voluntary, natural, ordinary movement, executed as was intended. Stone v. Fidelity
& Cas. Co. of N. 'Y., 133 Tenn. 672, 182 S. W. 252. But if any mischance
supervenes· even in such an intentional act, whereby an injury is caused!, the
injury is deemed accidental. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 213 Fed.
595. In such a case the injury is accidental in the sense that the injury is an
unforeseen and unexpected casualty. Accidental means are those which produce effects which are not their natural and probable consequences. -4 CooI.EY,
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BRIEFS ON INs., 3159. :Natural consequences are such as ought to be expcctea.
Probable consequences are those which are more likely to follow from the
use of a given means than to fail to follow.. Thus, reasons the court in the
instant case, since chance determines what person or persons shall be killed
in war, and since "of the. millions who serve as soldiers, comparatively few
are killed," the insured met death by accidental means, without his design,
consent, or co-operation, as the result of a hazard incident to his occupation.
As in another recent case, Interstate Business Men's Acc. As.r'n. of Des
lrfoi1~es, Io. v. Lester, 257 Fed. 225, where the beneficiaries of a similar policy
were allowed to recover for the death of an insured physician, who was shot
and killed while performing his duty as an officer of the National Guard on
emergency sen.·ice during a strike, the court refused to write into the policy
an exception to the effect that if the insured engaged in any military service
the insurance should cease. Every person in the course of his life is necessarily exposed to varying degrees of hazard. Simply going into an environment where the hazard is greater than that experienced in one's daily employment cannot remove a chance death in such environment from the class of
"deaths by accidental means," when the policy does not except such particular hazards. True, the decision seems to involve a liberal extension of
the principles enunciated in former cases, yet considering the words of the
policy and the hazard involved, it seems reasonable and.justified.
LANDI.ORD AND T£NA:-IT-CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION-NECESSITY FOlt ABANDONMENT.-The defendant rented a theatre building from the plaintiff for
three years. After a year's occupation the defendant vacated as a result of
the plaintiff's notice to quit for failure to pay rent. In an action by the plaintiff to recover rent the defendant counter-claimed for damages, the basis for
the counter-claim being an eviction caused by the landlord's using the basement of the building for the purpose of cutting and storing onions. Held,
that the counter-claim could not be allowed, for the tenant continued to
occupy the premises and pay rent after the obnoxious odors from the basement became apparent. Tos v. Olinger, (Wis., 1921), i81 N. W. 295.
A use of the adjoining premise$ by the landlord which materially interferes with the tenant's enjoyment of his own premises may result in a constructive eviction of the tenant. 2 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1279;
Grosvenor Hotel Company v. Hamilton, [1894] 2 Q. B. 836. The test seems
to be whether the use to which the adjoining premises are put would constitute a nuisance at common law. 2 TIFFANY, LANDI.ORD AND TENANT, 1281;
Sully v. Schmitt, 147 N. Y. 248. Hence, if the landlord knowingly rents the
adjoining premises to a person who operates a house of prostitution, the
tenant may claim an eviction. Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 727. But
to constitute an eviction the tenant must abandon the premises within a
reasonable time after the acts complained of. Commelin v. Theiss, 31 Ala.
412; Fox v. Murdock, 58 Misc. (N. Y.), 207. The principal case did not decide
whether the "odor with which nature has so bountifully endowed the onion,"
was a nuisance upon which an eviction might be predicated, but wisely eluded
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this p_erplexing question by holding that there could. be no eviction where the
teriant thereafter continued in the occupation of the premises. Beecher v.
Duffield, W Mich.
Taylor v. Finnegaii, 189 Mass. 568.
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LunTATIONs, STATUT£ oF-FRAuD AS RsPLY ro· PI.EA oF THE STA'!'UT£

NPT

AvAn.ABJ.it· AT LAw.-I~·an actic;m ·at law by the assignees of the pledgor

against the pledgee; w1iose debt had been paid, to recover the purchase money.
paid ·to the pledgee by the ptU"chaser of the pledged ·stcick, the evidenee
showed that the·plaintiff 1tad'sevC!ral times requested the pledgee to turn over
possession of the stock tQ hiin, buf instead of informing the plaintiff of the
sale, the pledgee stated that the· stock was in his possession and he would
turn it .over as soon as he could find the certificates. When the pJaintiff
learned of the sale he brought this action, and the defendant pleaded the
Statute of Limitations. Plaintiff replied that defendant was estopped to
plead the Statute of Limitations .by his fraudulent concealment or the accrual
of the cause of action. I;leld, (five judges dissenting) the defendant could
not be estopi;ied by fraudulent concealment to plead. the Statute of Limitations~ in a· court .of law, but that an estoppel of this nature was available only
in a court of equity as ground for relief against the prosecution of the action .
at law. 'Freeman v. Conover· (N. J., 1920) u2 Atl. 324The· questjon in this case is whether or not; in an action at law, frauq is
a proper matter. of reply to a plea of the Statute of Limitations. The· weight
of authority is that· fraud .is a good reply and operates as an estoppel against
the· defendant pleading the statute. Holma1~ v. Omaha & C. B. R.y. & Bridge
Co., U7 Ia. 268; Missouri, etc. Ry. v. ·Pratt~ 73 Kan. 210; Oklahoma Farm
Mortgage Co. v. Jordan, 168 Pac. 1029; Baker-Mathews Mfg. Co. v. Grayling
Lwmlier. Co., (Ark.) 203 S. W; 1021; .City .of Fort Worth v. Rosen, (Tex.)
203
8+ Contia, see Pieischv.Milbrath, 123 Wis. 647; St. Joseph & G. I.
Ry. ·Co: ·V. Elwood Grain Co., (Mo.) 203 S. W. 68o; Harper v; Harper, 252
Fed.39.

a
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.MINIMUM WAG:e ACT-NOT INVALID B:ecAtis:e No PRov1s10N·lS MADI; FoR
NOTICE TO ,E:MPLOY£Rs:-Under ·an act making it unlawful to employ women
in any industry at wages inadequat~ for maintenance, the Industrial Welfare
Commission ordered the minimum wage in the public housekeeping industry
to be raise<!. to eighteen dollars per week. Plaintiffs, operators of large hotels,.
contended that the act was void in making no provision for notice to persons
affected. · Held, ·under its policl" l)ower the legislature, through the Commission, can take. .away without notice whatever rights the employers have t()
employ women and minors, since they have no vested right to employ them.
Spokane Hotel C,o. v. Younger, (Wash., 1920), 194 Pac. 595.
Plaintiffs did not venture to question the ability of the Legisfature' under
its police power to. pass· a minimum wage act; its constitutional right to cio
this seei:ns ·to have been settled. once for all by the case. of Stettler v. O'Hara,
6g Ore. 51g, which was sustained by the Federal Supreme Court in 243 U.
·S. 629. The contributions made·by Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger to the law
~f the subject seem simply to be that such acts do not need to make provision

RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS

757

for notice and a hearing, as did the Oregon statute; since employers have no
ve,sted right to employ women and minors. This view would seem to accord
with Judge Cooley's definition of a vested right quoted in Pearsall v. Great
Northern Ry., 161 U. S. at 673, as the right to enjoyment, present or prospettive, that has become the property of some person or persons as a present
interest. The coµrt's further holding that the power delegated to the Commission by the Legislature was purely administrative seems based on principles equally obvious. ·The legislature itself had settled the only question of
policy involved, that is that an amount adequate for maintenance should be
established as a minimum wage. There is ample authority to establish the
principle that it could delegate to a commission the administrative duty of
determining the fact of what amount would be adequate for maintenance and
provide that upon the establishment of this fact the law should be· operative,
Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. at 6g2.
MUNICIPAL CoRPORA'l'IONS-POWER TO ACT AS TRUSTtt-BURIAL LoT.-A
bequest was left to a town on condition that the town care for a cemetery lot
in which testator's family lay buried. Upon petition by the· executor for a
construction of the will, held, that the bequest created a valid trust which the
town had authority to accept. Petition of Tuttle, (N. H., 11µ1) n2 Atl. 397.
A municipal corporation may take arid hold property as a gift or devi~e
from an individual in trust for specified purposes when the trust created is
germane to the purposes for which the corporation was organized, and when
the administration of the trust and the liabilities which it may impose are not
foreign to the declared objects of the corporation. Hatheway v. Sackett, 3:.;i
Mich. 97. Justice Story's opinion in Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. (U.
S.) IZ/, is particu1arly clear on this point. Historically, bequests to cities for
trust purposes have long been recognized. One of the earliest of these gifts
in this country is that of Dr. Franklin .to the cities of Philadelphia and Boston,
where the fund was used to help young married artificers. Gifts to charitable
uses are highly favored and liberally construed to accomplish the intent of the
donor. Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125; Ha"ington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485.
A bequest to a city as a trust to provide for the education of the poor was
upheld in McD011ogh v. Murdock, 14 U. S. 732. Bequests have also been
upheld for beautifying public grounds, and for establishing hospitals. f'mny
v. Croul, 76 Mich. 471; Dykeman v. Jenkins, _179 Ind. 549. The care of cemeteries has generally been recognized as a proper municipal function within
the public health duties of a city. Davorck v. Moore, 105 Mich. 120. The
rule aiainst perpetuities does not apply to gifts for charitable uses. 1/ills v.
Daviso1i, 54 N. J. Eq. 659. A perpetual trust cannot he created for an individual and !tis heirs in succession, fqrever; and it is here that a charity
differs, for a trust may be established which contemplates the payment of
the income of a certain fund to some charitable purpose forever. 2 P£RRY ON
TRUSTS, 687. The power of the legislature to alter and abolish municipal corporations is not defeated by the circumstances that the city is a trustee of a
charity, or of other private rights and interests. l DILLON I8I. See 14 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 49; IO MicH. L. Rr:v. 31, 120.
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llUNICIPAL ColtPORATIONS-SniswALKs--Ics CAUSED BY DBAINAG~ FROM

AWNING-AWNING NO'l' A NUISANCS.-A motion picture theatre had constructed an awning in such a manner that water drained .from the awning
onto the edge of "the sidewalk. The plaintiff was injured by falling on ice
which had frozen from this water. In" an action against the city, held, that
the awning was not such a nuisance that the city 'was _bound to remove it.
Maine v. City of Des Moines, (Iowa, 1921) 181 N. W. 248.
Where a city by its own act negligently permits water to collect and
freeze on its wa~s, it is liable for injury proximately resulting to pedestrians.
Holbert v. Philadelphia, 221 Pa. 266, (failure to keep a sidewalk under a viaduct properly drained); Walsh v. New York, lOC) App. Div. 541, (leaky
hydrant adjacent to a sidewalk). But generally the city cannot be held where
the injury results from the act or omission of the abutting owner. HanrahatJ
v. Chicago, 145 Ill. App. 38, (awning falling on the plaintiff). But the city
may be liable where jt negligently allows the abutting owner to retain a nuisance, as where the abuttor's awning was constructed so near to the curb that
a truck knocked out the support and caused the awning to fall on the plaintiff.
Mansfield v. New York, u9 App. Div. 199. And where the city has been
compelled to pay damages as a result of the abuttor's act of conveying water
onto the sidewalk to freeze, i~ is entitled to reimbursement from the abutting
owner. New York v. Dimric_k, 49 Hun. 241. See 19 MxcH. L. Rsv. 549- It
seems that the abutting owner may be charged whenever he creates a condition which artificially causes water to flow upon the sidewalk and freeze so
that the walk is rendered unsafe for pedestrians. Canfield v. Chicago & W.
M. R. Co., 78 Mich. 356, (water leaking from a water tank); Molony v. Hayes,
2o6 Mass. 1, (water from the defendant's roof); .Macauley v. Schneider, 9
App. Div. 2'79. (water collecting under the abuttor's awning). But the abtittor
cannot be charged if the water collected on the walk from natural rather than
from artificial conditions: Greenlaw v. Millikin, 100 Me. 440.
N£CLIGSNC£-ATTRACTIVS Nu1SANce.-The defendants had at their station
a-mechanical moving staircase or escalator worked by an endless band. At
the top, the band passed around a wheel where it was open to sight and
touch, and was not fenced off or protected. The room was open to the street.
There was a ticket collector at the bottom of the staircase and another
behind a window in the booking hall. It was common practice for children
to play upon the staircase, generally in the evening, by running down as
far as they could without being caught by the ticket collector at the bottom.
They were always warned off, and a railway policeman whose duty to·ok
him into the booking hall twice every hour, always drove the children away.
On the evening of the accident, he drove them away, but later, they returned,
and with them the plaintiff, a boy of five. The children looked around to
see if the policeman was gone, and discovering that he was, commenced to
play. Plaintiff caught his hand in the moving stairway and was injured so
badly amputation was necessary. In an action for negligence, held, the plaintiff was a trespasser, and the· defendants are not liable. Hardy v. Central
Londo" Rtiilway Co., [1920] 3 K. B. 459-
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In this case involving the doctrine of. an attractive nuisance, the English
court distinguishes the leading case of Cooke v. Midland & Gt. Western Ry.,
[I909j A. C. 229, in which an infant was injured by playing on a turntable,
saying, "ttJere the decision clearly proceeded upon the inference that the
children resorted to the turntable with the tacit permission of the Railway
Co.," while in the instant case the children deliberately did what they knew
they were forbidden to do, and the warnings brought home to them negatived
the allurement afforded by the moving staircase. The American cases, known
as the "turntable" cases, I9 L. R A. (N. S.) 1094. Note, do not emphasize
this distinction, although in Comer v. Winston-Salem, I78 N. C. 383, discussed in I8 Micii. L. REV. 340, the court held where neighborhood children
had been accustomed to play near a bridge, it was negligence not to provide
sufficient protection for children watching the colored water rushing through
under the bridge. Ever since the first case of this sort, Railroad v. Stout,
Ii Wall. 657, citing the English case of Lynch v. Nurdin, I Q. B.· 29, IO L.
]. Q. B. 73, the tendency has been to limit the application of the attractive
nuisance doctrine. For a complete discussion see 5 MICH. L. REv. 357. It
would seem as if the English court has worked out a distinction by asking
whether the child is an invitee by tacit permission, but has not solved the
difficulty, for 'it is always a question as to just what makes a tacit invitation,
and one· by no means easy of solution, although this test may be very effective
in denying any further extension to new sets of facts of the "turntable"
principle.
.l:"ARTIES-St:IT BY REPRESENTATIVES OF A CLASS-)URISDIC'l'ION OF FEDERAL

CouRTs.-Several hundred members of 'the Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur, an
Indiana fraternal beneficiary society, filed a bill in the United States District
Court in Indiana, on their own behalf and as representatives of several thousand other 'members of the same class, to enjoin certain uses of trust funds
held by the society. No Indiana members were individually named as parties.
A decree was made. The Indiana members of the society subsequently commenced actions in the Indiana State courts i~volving ·the same matters decided in the federal case, and the question was presented whether the Indiana
members were so far parties to the federal suit as to be bound l;>y the federal
decree and precluded from relitigating in the State courts. Held, on certificate to the Unite!! States Supreme Court, that all'members of the class, both
in and out of Indiana, were boun9 by the decree. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur
v. Cauble, (U. S. Sup. Ct., No. 274), decided March 7, I92I.
This raises and settles. a very interesting and important question. It was
considered by the lower federal court that fhe Indiana members could not
be deemed present in the suit by class representation because their presence
would oust the court of jurisdiction, since the sole ground of federal jurisdiction was diverse citizenship. 264 Fed. 247. But the .Supreme Court of the
United States held that class suits were long known to the equit)r practice,
that such a suit could have been maintained in a State court, that federal
courts must· he deemed to exercise as broad equity powers as State courts of
equity, that unless a decree in such a suit would be binding on all ·members,
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whether resident in the same State as the federal forum or elsewhere, the
federal courts would be practically excluded from handling important cases
of this nature, for it would be intolerable to allow parallel class suits to proceed in State and federal courts for or against differen_t groups of the same
class. The decision makes the relatiOn between those members of the class
who are actually present and those who are merely present by representation,
the same, for jurisdictional purpos~s, as the relation between trustees and.
beneficiaries, for it always has been held that it is the citizenship of the administrator or executor- (Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Bobo, 232 Fed. 7o8), or
trustee (Johnson v. City of St. Louis, 172 Fed. 31, g6 C. C. A. 617), or receiver. (Irvine v. ~ankard, 181 Fed. 206), or guardian (Mexican Centro! Ry.
Co. v. Eckman, 187 U. S. 429), and not the citizenship of the parties beneficially interested, which controls the jurisdiction of the federal court.

Pum:,1c- SERVICE CoRPORATioNs-FRES Us£ oF GAs :sy· LESSOR-DUTY oF
S£RVIC£.-Plaintiff, a public service corporation, sued to enjoin defendant from interfering with its pipes. Its success depended upon the invalidity of a covenant in its lease giving the defendant, the lessor, the right
to supply his residence with gas without charge, by connecting it with plaintiff's well. · Plaintiff contended the covenant was ".Oid because in violation of
a statute requiring public service corporations to serve all on equal term$.
Held, the effect of the covenant was to give the company the right to devote
to the public service only so much as remains after the reasonable demands
of the defendant are satisfied, and the provision of law referred to, is therefor, not applicable. Pittsburgh & West· Va. Gas Co. v. Nicholsot~, (W. Va.,
1921) 105 S. E. 784.
Ordinarily under a provisi~n of law requiring public service corporations
to serve all on equal terms, a· contract to render service in return for anything but a monetary consideration is .invalid. Dorr v. Railroad. Co., 78 W.
Va. 764; Bell v. Kanawha T. Co., 83 W. Va. 640; Shrader v. Steubenville Co.,
9!) S. E. 2C1Ji City of Charleston v. Public Service Comm., 103 S. E. 673.
Thus, an agreement by a raih:oad company to issue annual· passes for a period
of years in return for a grant of land is invalid under such a provision.
Dorr v. Railroad Co., supra; Bell v. Kanawha .Tr. Co., supra. Also an agreement to do sO: in settlement of a claim for injuries, Louisville & N • .[?.. Co.
v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 4rl ;. or in return for advertising, State_ v. U. Pac., 87
Neb. 29; U. S. v. C. I. & l. R." Co., 163 Fed. II4. An agreement to furnish
free water to 'l'- city in return for the right to lay mains in the streets is likewise objectionable under such a provision. Even though such agreements are
lawful when made, a subsequent law requiring uniformity of rates will invalidate them, and the clause in the federal constitution forbidding;the states
t~ pass laws i~piliring'the obligation of contracts affords them no p~tection.
Raymond Lumber Co. v. Raymond Light & _Water Co., 92 Wash. 330; Hite
v. C. I. & W. R. Co., 284 Ill. 297. In order to be certain of the uniformity
which the legislature seeks to secure by such provisions, an unvarying standard is necessary, and the only feasible one is ·money. If .services and materials
fumisLed are com~ensated for with· money, the recipients can purchase serv-
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ices on the same basis as others, and equality is assured. Shrader v. Steubenville Co., supra; State v. U. Pac., supra. But 'in the principal case, the court
holds that where there is a reservation of a portion of the subject-matter by
the party seeking to compel service, the result is otherwise, and that the effect
of the arrangement in that case was to reserve such an interest to the lessor.
Had the agreement been to render the same class of service to the defendant
as to the rest of the public, the agreement would have been invalid. The gas
supplied to the owner of the fee, however, never reached the public mains,
and remained private property.. The theory seems to be that having the right
to retain the whole, the lessor may retain an undivided interest in such part
as he chooses. The illustration suggested by the court is not a happy. one.
It is that of a lessor of a farm, reserving a portion of the crop, and his tenant.
True, no one would deny the right of the lessor to the.reserved crops. Neither
could anyone complain if the agreement was that the tenant pay a ·rental and
sell a portion of the produce to the lessor at a low price. '!'he analogy is
obviously defective.
Ri;:wARDs-RrGHT oF >.. SH:eiuFF MAKING J\RRi;:sT ro Cun1 Ri;:wAlll>.-A
murder had been committed in M county. The sheriff of that county gave
information· to the sheriff of B county which enabled the latter to find and
arrest the murderer. There was an equitable proceeding to determine how an
offered reward should lie distributed. Held, since the sheriff of ll county
was armed with a warrant, he was charged with the official duty of doing all
in his power to secure the arrest of the accused and could not, therefore, take
a r,eward; but the sheriff of B county; having no warrant requiring him to
apprehend a person charged with a crime in another jurisdiction, was consequently under no -official obligation to arrest or detain the suspect and could
take a reward. Maggi v. Cassidy, (Ia., l!)ZI) 181 N. W. 2'/.
Due to the public policy involved the welf settled general rule is that an
officer eannot receive or recover a reward for doing an act which it is his
official duty to perform. Marking v. Needy and Hatch, 71 Ky. (8 Bush.) 22.
The principal case applies this rule. The courts are apparently much influenced by the fact that, generally speaking, a sheriff's ·authority and duty to
act officially, either within or without his 'jurisdiction, depend on the writ or.
warrant with which he is armed. Marsh v. Wells Fargo & Co. Express, 88
Kan. 538. Since some jurisdictions hold that the powers, duties, and compensation of sheriffs shall be entirely statutory, (McArlhur v. Boynton, I9.
Colo. App. 234; Benson v. Smith, 42 Me. 414), reference must be had in a
particular case· to the statute in force to find out whether the officer who
claims the reward. was under an ·official duty to act as he did. Of course
aside from the question of public policy involved, the whole matter rests in
last analysis on the unquestioned _principle of contract law that merely per·
forming one's official duty does not constitute sufficient consideration ·for a
promise. Worthen v. ThQmpson 'i4 Ark. 151.

TID:SPASS-Lle£NS£-DUTY OF METER R£AD£& 'ro KNOCK Bl!!'OU: EN'J't>RINO
Dwat.1NG.-D Co. furnished electricity to P under a contract which pro--
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vided that D and its agents should have tree access to the meters and service
for purposes of examination. X, an employee of D, entered P's house without rapping and without announcing his presence for the purpose of reading
the meter, and seriously frightened P who was unaware of his entry. Held,
D, was liable for injury to inmate through fright. Mollinaur v. U11ion Elec.tric Co., (Yo., 1921) 2Z7 S. W • .265.
While the court conceded that the agents of D under the terms of the
contract had a license, the liability of D was predicated on its. abuse by D's·
agents, since ordinary· prudence and a wholesome regard for the sanctity of
the home requires that no entrance be made without announcing one's presence. In Hitchcock v. Hudson Gas Co., 71 N. J. L. s65, D's agent having
been refused admittance to remove a meter, subsequently returned and broke
into P's home, and it was held that D was not liable since be acted under a
license. But in Reed v. New York Gas Co., 87 N. Y. S. 810, D was held
liable for breaking into P's cellar in order to remove the meter on the ground
that, as i!l the principal case, an abuse of a license renders one a trespasser
ab initio; but the case may be distinguished from the New Jersey decision on
the ground that it does not appear from the report that the agent had previously requested admittance. As to whether damages should be recoverable
when resulting from fright, in an analagous case a trespassing meter reader
was held to render his master liable for damages resulting froiµ mental
anguish. Bouillion v. Laclede Gas Co., 148 Mo. App. 462. It would seem
that where the cause of the mental suffering_ is the trespass on P's property, recovery should be allowed. Watson v. Dilts, u6 Ia. 249; 17 MrcH. L.
Rsv. 40f; 3'4 HARV. L. Rsv. 28o.
TIUAir-INSTRUCTION TO FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY IN A CRIMINAL

CAss.-Thc :defendant was indicted for selling liquor contrary to the local
option law. The evidence for· the !.tate was uncontradicted and the judge
instructed the jury that it was their duty to find the defendant guilty. Held,
no error. People v. Berridge (1921), 212 Mich. S77·
It is generally held to be error to direct a verdict of guilty in a criminal
case under ·any circumstances. I.11cas v. Commonwealth, u8 Ky. 818; Perkins v. State, so Ala. 1s4. And there are but few recognized exceptions to
this rule. In Michigan· a long line of decisions has established the right of
the court to instruct the jury to return a verdict of guilty in cases where
no question of intent is involved. People v. Ne11man11, 85 Mich. o8 (selling
liquor to a minor); People v. Elmer, 109 Mich. 493 (disorderly conduct).
But the judge cannot discharge the jury and enter a verdict cf guilty, nor
can he coerce the jury into returning such a verdict. People v. WaN:en, 122
Mich. So+ Arkansas allows the direction of a verdict of guilty where the
offense is a mere misdemeanor p_unishable by fine. Stelle v. State, 77 Ark.
441. As to the rule in the United States courts, see I9 MICH. L. Rsv. 325.
TRIAir-QUOTIEN'l' Vr:RDICT.-Amount that each juror thought the plaintiff should recover was set down and these then added and the average found.
After a motion made by one juror to make it even money, leaving off $83 and·
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some odd cents, the sum of $II,700 was adopted as the verdict. There was
a discussion by the jury as to a quotient verdict's illegality and testimony that
for this reason the exact amount of quotient was not returned. However,
there was a disagreement in the evidence, and a conflict in the testimony given
by the jurors impeaching the verdict as to whether the average was to be
final and binding or merely for ascertaining a basis for discussion. Held,
since not dearly shown, the verdict was binding, it was not a quotient verdict
and was good. Smith v. Hines, (Kans., 1921), 194 Pac. 318.
A prior Kansas case, Johnson v. Husband, (1879) 22 Kan. z17, held that
though there was conflict in the testimony of the jurors as to a previous
binding agreement, since at least four of the jurors believed that the quotient
finally obtained by such marking, aggregation and division, should be their
verdict, it should be set aside ?11 proper motion. It is enough to vitiate the
verdict if the greater number of the jury agreed that the quotient was to be
binding even though all did not. Sslvester v. Town of Casey (1900), no Ia.
256. Where all lhe jury make such an agreement the verdict is void. iVerner
v. EdmistoK (188o), 24 Kan. 147.· Other cases are cited in Ann. Cas. 1917 C
1224. The verdict is void where all agre~, even though a nominal sum is
later added without deliberation to make the amount an even number. Ottawa
''· Gilliland (1901), 63 Kan. 165. Whisenant v. Schawe (Tex., 19n), 141 S.
W. 146. In the case of Clark v. Ford (1900), IO Kan. App. 579, the court
decided that a verdict which is more nearly the result of a ~athematical calculation than the deliberate judgment of the jury, cannot stand. But the
polling of the jury was held to repel any presumption of a quotient verdict,
though the amount was the same on the second verdict, which the judge had
caused the jury to bring in after returning to the jury room, because they had
admitted to him that the first had been arrived at by addition and division.
Roy v. Goings (1885), 112·m. 656. If after the quotient is obtained and due.
deliberation it· is returned as a just verdict, it is not legally objectionable.
Battle Creek v. Haak (1905), 139 Mich. 514 Other cases may be found in 16
Ann. Cases, 9n. But the court ought not to suggest such a proceeding to
the jury. Kansas City R.R. Co. v. Ryan (18g2), 49 Kan. 1. The majority of
courts follow the cases. cited above, that this manner of arriving at the ver·
diet is in. itself illegal, but it has beeri decided that it does not necessarily
follow that it must be set aside, and the verciict may be legal as long -as
moderate in amount and no extravagant abuse is shown. Cleland v. Borough
of .Carlisle (1898), 186 Pa.·st. no. Cowperthwaite v. Jones (1790), 2 Dau:
55. I;. would seem that the court in the principal case might well have been
governed by the previous rulings of the same court in Johnson v. Husband or
Ottawa v. Gilliland, (supra), but it left the matter of evidence to the trial
court properly and found that a prior agreement was not shown. It might
be noted that such a case would not arise in the United States courts, since
McDonald v. Pless (1915), 238 U. S. 264, which ruled that because of the
controlling· consideration of public policy, a juror might not impeach his own
verdict, even though the court found there had actually been a quotient verdict. See Roy v. Goings; (supra), for the same rule, and Flanagan v. Coleman ( 1918), 255 Fed. 178.
·
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WILLS-BEQUEST "IN TRUST" CR£AttS ABSOLUTE GIFT.-Testator left
the residue of his e~tate "in trust" to ·his three executors, directing that they
should use their best judgment and that they should not be 1·equired to give
pond. A separate bequest had been made to one of the executors. In a bill
for the construction of the residuary clause, held, not to create a trust, but
an absolute gift. Iii re Devers Will. Orr v. Thompson, et al (Wis., I!)2I),
I8o N. W. 839.
The language of the will in the instant case more clearly indicates an ineffective atteplpt to ·create a trust than that of Harvey v. Griggs, III -~ti. 431,
where a direction· to dispose or' property "according to best judgment'' was
ht.;ld to create an absolute gift. See note to that case, I9 MICH. L. REV. 455.
The view that the words "in trust" are not conclusive as to the intention of
the testator is in accord with Norman v. Prince-, 40 R. I. 402. But see contra,
Haskell v. Staples, u6 Me. IOJ, where the same language, following a separate
bequest to the executor, as in the instant case, was held to create a trust
void for.uncertainty.
\VILLS-DEC£PTION REGARDING MARRIAGE IS FRAUD WHICH Avoms Ll;GACIES Tultiu;:ny PROCUR£D.-A wife made a residuary bequest to a man whom
she described as, and· whom she believed to be, her lawful husband. He had
induced her to enter into the marriage by false representations that he was
free to marry, whereas in fact he had a wife living from whom he was not
divorced. In i>roceedings to contest the will, held, that the deception warranted the·inference that the will was the result of the fraud, and that the
case should not have been taken from the jury. In re Carso~s Estate (Cal.,
I920), I94.Pac. 5.
The earliest reported case dealing with the question seems to be Ke1usell
v. Abbott (I799):, 4 Ves. Bo/', in which a legacy to the "husband" of the testatrix was held to be avoided by the former's false assumption of that character.
the existence of which alone in the court's opinion, could be supposed to be
the motive of the gift. In Wilkinson v. Joughin, L. R. 2 Eq. 319, a bequest
to the testator's supposed wife was declared void for a similar fraud. In
Rishton ·v.· Cobb, S Myl. & Cr•. I45. a bequest to a woman "so long as she
shail .continµe single and unmarried" was held to be valid, even though unknown to the testator, she was married at the date of- the will, on -the ground
that there was a. mere inaccuracy in the description of the legatee:. But ·this
decision
questioned in In re Boddington, 50 L.
R 701." As pointed
.out in this case, ·two things must appear: first, a false assumption of th.: character of the legatee; second, evidence, or a presuinption, that ·the false character was· the motive for the gift. Thus, if there is no intentional decep-tion, the 8if.t ·is valid even though there may be a misdescription. In re Boddington-, supra (where a legacy was given to the wife and later the marriage
was annulled and· declared void ab imtio due to the impotency of the tes·
tator); Philip Dries Case, ~ N. ]. Eq. 475 (where the wife did not know
tliat she was not free to re-marry). See also, Weening v. Temple, 144 Ind.
i8g. If it appears that-the testator·knows. of the deception, the bequest of the
legacy is ~alid . .In re Will of Donnely, 68 Iowa 126; Moore v. Heineke, u9

was

T:

RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
Ala. 6z/. Some nice questions may arise as to whether a description enters
into the essence an~ motive of the gift. In Fanindra Deb Raikat v. Rajiswas
Dass, L. R. 12 Ind. App. 72, the clause "by virtue of your ·being my adopted
son"· was held to express the essential motive of the gift, which failed because the adoption was invalid. But generally a misnomer of a legatee or
devisee does not invalidate the bequest, if from the witt itself or by extrinsic
evidence the object of the. testator's bounty can be ascertain.ed. St. Luke's
Home v. Association, 52 N. Y. 332; Smith v. Kimball, 62 N. H. 6o6. The
distinction between a description which expresses the motive of the gift and
shows that it was induced by the character falsely assumed by the beneficiary,
and a description justifying the conclusion that the gift to the person falsely
descri~ was induced ·by a desire to benefit the beneficiary personii.tly regardless of the. relation, is shown in Wilkinson v. Joughin, supra. There a gift to
"my wife Adelaide" failed for fraud practised on the testator by Adelaide,
but a gift to her daughter described as "my stepdaughter Sarah" was good
as it was shown that the testator did not intend to benefit her personalty.

